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LATTY AND "CORPORATIONS"
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Scholarly work is its own tribute to a scholar, as are the contributions in this symposium to Jack Latty, whose scholarly ideas, assessed
appreciatively by Professor Lattin in an earlier issue,' have invigorated
the field of corporation law for more than fifty years. So does the law
school which he led as dean mark his wider impact on legal education.
But the style and influence of the man would be missed in a review of the
area where he concentrated his academic interests unless some observations were included about Latty as a "teaching entrepreneur" and about
"corporations" as an academic enterprise.
Teaching entrepreneurship is hereby defined as a form of association
comprising one person and an educational institution: purpose is understood but not stated; control as a unitary concept cannot be located; net
gains cannot be measured or reported; services offered are indefinable;
periodic losses, acutely felt, are guaranteed; and the risk of final judgment of failure is high, although bankruptcy per se is rarely a cause of
dissolution.
Law professors have no difficulty entering into such an association
because all law professors are gods, as most law students quickly perceive
without undue wonderment. The great gods, like Latty, fired by infernal
questions that must be handed on, actually appear in human form.
Thus came Professor Elvin R. Latty to Duke in 1937 in a gray,
tweed sport coat. (Later, as dean, he sported 'a homburg with equal
aplomb as he scoured the whole country for better students, better
faculty, and more money for the law school.) He was known for having
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taught romance languages and having coached track, suggesting an enviable versatility, and it was said that he had forsaken, for academe, a lucrative Wall Street practice. ("Lucrative" was pinpointed by student
gossip at an incredibly high $10,000, then five times the highest salary for
beginning lawyers.) Latty was asked, as a newcomer, to deliver a chapel
talk in the gothic cathedral which towers over the Duke campus. I do
not remember the religious message, but I do remember his sweeping up
to the pulpit in flowing black robes set off, perfectly for his personality,
by white saddle shoes.
The saddle shoes were his trademark. They cushioned his swift,
last-minute entrance stride down the classroom aisle. He also wore them
to frequent law school social affairs, where everybody, in those days, was
dancing, and when law students whirled Mrs. Latty away, he whirled
away their dates with dignified ebullience.
His ebullience was undiminished in class, where the academic
message, unlike the chapel theme, was unforgettable. If it was not then
always perfectly clear, as with a Zen lesson, time lent it cohesion. Its
essence was the superior rating of the question over the answer, if the two
must be so ranked-a rating running contrary to the suppositions of the
uninitiated and the expectations of most students. Isn't the known answer, after all, the objective, especially in law? True, but the question is
the indispensable means for getting at it. It can shape the objective. It
can unveil the pretensions and reveal the complexities of the objective. It
can bring an answer, but so can it bring a realization that the answer is
only an apparent one and really a sinking mire.
Thus is Latty held in the mind's eye wielding his favorite short,
chopping tools: "what if," "what about," "how come," and "suppose,"
pondering the ceiling with eyebrows raised, expecting or demanding attempts to answer, attempting himself, admitting bafflement, shrugging,
laughing at the legal or human predicament revealed, reddening occasionally when two students in the back of the room exchanged confidential answers. (If the conversation was intra vires the subject, he wanted it
disclosed; if not, he wanted it stopped.) And thus can he be assured, if
his mortal guise troubled him with doubts about the immortality of his
teaching, that he is still remembered by thousands of lawyers everywhere, somewhat as a god, but more as an engaging human. In their
counseling, litigating, legislating, judging, reforming, teaching and using
law, they cannot keep from reflecting the searching, probing, "seeking"
side of law, divine and human, absorbed in large measure from Latty.
For all those questions, it is now clear, served a common thrust: to
expose, as a first step, the uncompleted thinking shielded by doctrinal
generalities, majestic legal phrases, and conclusory labels. That first step
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then leads on to a realization of the work to be done in making and
reasoning about hard choices, and in analyzing the crucial "facts" and
considerations that constitute the conflict, the problem, and the solution.
The interaction of those facts and considerations and of legal goals in
decisions, statutes, and regulations can thus be isolated, and the further
interaction of law and social policy understood and planned.
Latty did not invent that way of thinking about law, but he epitomized it. In the 1930s, Columbia-where he did his doctoral work-was
a garden of legal realism. The main lines of that philosophy and the
inquiries it advocated were congruent with his own. The tenets of legal
realism and his teaching message emerge from his doctrinal thesis, later
published in book form, 2 in which he concentrated on an issue at the
heart of "corporations" as an academic subject: the relationship between
the concept of incorporation and the insulation from liability afforded
individual and corporate shareholders under that concept.
That insulation from owners' responsibility for the obligations of an
enterprise is a central attribute and advantage of the corporate form.
And the "separateness" of a legal corporate entity also insulates other
corporate entities, including those within the same business or economic
enterprise, from liability for the obligations of any other. The insulation
is said to be "normal," but it is not unfailing. The terminology of its
denial-that the corporate "veil" will be "pierced," or the corporate "entity" "disregarded"-compels the question "when" and "why." The answers repeated in judicial opinions-whenever it would be "equitable,"
or fraud would otherwise result, or injustice would otherwise be done, or
whenever the pierced or disregarded entity is a mere agent, instrumentality, dummy, or alter ego-illustrate the easy use of empty language. Behind such contentless phrases, as Latty showed, are facts in such
categories as capital inadequacy, stopping short of steps to complete corporate financing and operation, commingling or confusion of assets, and
the calculated policy of "milking" one entity for the benefit of another or
for the entity's shareowners. Of further bearing are such factual considerations as the nature of the liability asserted (a tort arising from
foreseeably dangerous activity?), the plaintiff's position (an eyes-open
contract creditor who "consented" to being relegated to the assets of this
entity?), and the defendant's interests (an individual shareholder or a
parent corporation with insulated individual shareholders?).
Educationally, the implications from such factual considerations
suggest, on one issue alone, that the real nature of a lawyer's work is
awareness, inquiry, and assessment of facts. Academically, also, predict2. E. LATTY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS (1936).
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able paths of decision are exposed by such an analysis. Putting "disregard," for example, in the factual light of not separating, deliberately or
negligently, the "estate" of one corporation from the separate estate of
the shareholder, or of a related corporation, as Latty put it,3 illuminates
one such path, if it is not mistaken as the only path, through a tangled
underbrush of judicial terminology. It also invites new comparisons,
such as juxtaposition of corporate asset segregation with older and more
familiar problems of the segregation of partnership property from the
partners' individual assets.
On the strictly practical side, no claim need be made that clarifying
theories bring quick order to a jungle of notions deeply rooted in metaphor. "Disregard" cases are still ringing old changes fondly.4 Some
courts may see the profferred light but brush it off. The facts in Bartle v.
Homeowners Cooperative, Inc., 5 for example, afforded the New York
Court of Appeals an opportunity-which it conspicuously let pass-to
illuminate the controlling considerations in its decision. The subsidiary
was milked. Eventually, and perhaps predictably, it became bankrupt.
It was organized, in the dissenting opinion's words, to enable the parent
cooperative corporation's shareholders to obtain at cost houses constructed by the subsidiary, and "business was done on such a basis that
[the subsidiary] could not make a profit."' 6 The dissent, citing Latty,
viewed the factual situation as containing those factors noted in Latty's
book 7 as present in cases in which the parent corporation was held liable.
The majority, noting that incorporation is permitted "for the very purpose of escaping personal liability,"' 8 chose not to withhold insulation
and not to elucidate. It observed only that "the outward indicia of these
two separate corporations was at all times maintained," that the creditors
"were in no wise misled," and that "there has been neither fraud, misrepresentation, nor illegality." 9 Thus tucked in with the usual phraseology
was the hint, though not an unmistakable one, that contract creditors
dealing with subsidiaries must take them as they are, no matter how they
are, as long as "form" is strictly observed. Left doubtful is whether such
a conclusion would apply only to creditors, like these, who knew that the
3. Id. at 183-84.
4. Eg., Kavanaugh v. Ford Motor Co., 353 F.2d 710, 717 (7th Cir. 1965); Tanner v. Presidents-First Lady Spa, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 950, 956 (E.D. Mo. 1972); Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank, 338
F. Supp. 525, 530 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Service Afloat, Inc. v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 458, 464

(Cust. Ct. 1972); Penntube Plastic Co. v. Flurotex, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 698, 702 (D.S.C. 1971);
Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Winkler, 249 F. Supp. 771, 776 ($.D.N.Y. 1966).
5. 309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E.2d 832 (1955).
6. Id. at 107; 127 N.E.2d at 834.
7. E. LA', supra note 2, at 138-39.
8. 309 N.Y. at 106, 127 N.E.2d at 833.
9. Id. at 106-07, 127 N.E.2d at 833.
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subsidiary was in a "difficult financial situation" and made an extension
agreement with it under which they even took over construction responsibilities. Or, narrowing it still further, whether the scale was tipped by
the circumstance that the ultimate loss from a successful claim would
have fallen in some measure on returning veterans who were helping
themselves get low-cost housing by private arrangements they thought
would work.
The way of the world may not let us hope that all fog will be dispelled by an assignment of precise weights to such Bartle factors in every
case. But a little gloom over the general trend is due when the fog is
thickened with recent, un-Latty-like remarks about the anatomical characteristics of parent-subsidiary domination. In Berger v. Columbia
BroadcastingSystem, Inc., 10 the plain, nonbiological facts were that the
wholly-owned subsidiary (CBS Films, Inc.) was organized to obtain general film distribution rights to shows and films also televised on the network of the parent (CBS Inc.). The directors and officers of the
subsidiary were employees of the parent, as is not uncommon, and the
subsidiary was regarded by at least some, on the testimony of a comptroller, as a "division" of the parent. The plaintiff had devised a "fashion
show" which was "scouted" personally by the subsidiary's vice-president
and the parent's director of special events, after which the subsidiary obtained from the plaintiff the exclusive nine-year film distribution rights,
and first refusal for television broadcast, on the plaintiff's show, or any
"similar type" show, as produced in a pilot film made with advances
from the subsidiary. Then the same parent officer who had "scouted"
the plaintiff's show worked with others to develop a second show "similar in all material respects to the plaintiffs."1 1 The parent obtained from
others nine-year exclusive broadcasting rights on the second show "and
similar shows" and televised the second show, but not the plaintiff's. The
plaintiff alleged a breach by the parent of the plaintiff's contract with the
subsidiary on the grounds that the subsidiary was the "alter ego" and
mere "instrumentality" of the parent. The district court treated both
corporations as one for purposes of the action. 12 The Fifth Circuit
thought "it had no alternative but to reverse" because the plaintiff "failed
to prove" that the subsidiary was the "alter ego of the [parent] defendant."1 3 Noting evidence, excluded by the district court as irrelevant, that
the parent was not required to "buy," nor the subsidiary to sell to the
parent, a film acquired by the subsidiary, and finding an absence of evi10.
11.
12.
13.

453 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 993.
Id. at 994.
Id. at 997-98.
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dence of "actual" domination, the court said that the potential for domination is not enough.14 "Just as siamesing is a biological fact," said the
court, "so must corporate umbilication be anatomically demonstrated
under New York law," 15 noting in conclusion that:
New York law respects corporate identity, and its destruction by piercing or surrogation requires substantiation of facts, not just organizational charts and labels. The instrumentality referred to in New York
cases requires a specific kinetic result, and muscularity to effect such
result must be demonstrated. Plaintiff's omission to prove such muscularity constitutes his failing. 16
The parent control necessary for liability, then, is energetic domination manifested with muscle. Here no muscle was displayed. Without
deploring at length the court's display of metaphor, Latty might have
inquired, to show how facts reduce the meaning of metaphor, whether
the "muscle failure" owed anything to the fact, alluded to early in the
opinion, that the "commentator" for the plaintiff's show was the wife of
the subsidiary's vice-president. Did such a liaison between the subsidiary
and the plaintiff put the subsidiary and parent asunder for this particular
liability?
The value of such questions does not lie in one case, 17 one issue, or
one academic field. Latty pressed them in an early course he called
"Chattel Transactions," with mimeographed materials of his own, about
contentlessness in such words as "sale," "gift," "possession," and "property." More of the same inquiry came in his "Business Associations,"
just as similar questions and similar methods characterize teaching of
lasting effect in any subject.
However gratifying to a teacher that his ideas apply beyond a particular subject through a whole web of law, the web appears, in school, in
strands and sections. Some teachers barely get beyond a necessary preoccupation with fascinating strands. A salute is due the teacher who
achieves identification with a whole section of the web, and such a salute
brings the state of that section under review.
14. Id. at 998.
15. Id. at 996.
16. Id. at 998.
17. Similar relationships have been mentioned without indication of the weight, if any, accorded them in decision. Thus, a principal was held not vicariously liable when an employee injured
a plaintiff who was the employee's friend. Dumas v. Lloyd, 6 Ill. App. 2d 1026, 286 N.E.2d 566
(1972). The insurance company of a master held vicariously liable when its servant ran down his
own father was held entitled to indemnity from the servant. Romford Ice & Coal Storage Co. v.
Lister, [1956] 2 Q.B. 180. A plaintiff-principal in a negligence action was relieved of any imputation
of contributory negligence from the negligence in that transaction of the principal's office manager,
who was his son-in-law. Brown v. Poitzky, 30 N.Y.2d 289, 283 N.E.2d 751 (1972).
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In the forty years of Latty's interest, "Corporations" has been cemented in central place in the curricula of most schools, held there more
by a tradition of supposed necessity than by popular interest. Whether as
a single course-required, recommended, or freely elected-or as a basic
segment of a major interest area of several courses, or of a combined
degree, the popular view has had it concerned mostly with necessary formalities, internal organizational technicalities, and the mechanics of
commercially organized wealth. Older casebooks steeped these ingredients in metaphysics. Mistrust of corporations prevailed in the forepart of
the century, and much of the legal conflict raged on the battle-line of
limitations on corporate powers. Corporations were to be created for
limited times and limited purposes, to be specified, and one function of
the law was to hold them to those legal limitations. Vital questions were
viewed, therefore, in terms of birth, being, and power. A leading
casebook published in 191318 devoted five of its ten chapters to "the legal
conception of a corporation," "corporations de jure," "corporations de
facto," "the powers of a corporation," and "ultra vires"-all matters
treated now almost in passing, if at all.
Each new edition of later casebooks took on more than it unloaded
or compressed about such items as proper and defective organization
procedures, record inspection, shareholder lists, meeting protocol, voting
mechanics, article and bylaw provisions, organic change requirements,
and formalities of merger and dissolution. With new federal securities
materials added, the whole dry weight topped out at 5-1/2 pounds and
1816 pages for the latest edition of a well-known casebook on
corporations. 1 9
What an academic subject with such an identity needs is an identity
crisis. "Corporations," fortunately or not, has never been without one.
It has never been definable as the academic reflection of a specialized
field of practice, with boundaries marked accordingly. "Corporation
lawyers"-firms with substantial practice for corporate clients-are
more likely to be worrying over an antitrust, tax, labor, real estate, negotiable instruments, government regulatory, or other problem encompassed by other curricular subjects than a traditional corporations one;
and if it is a corporations one, it is rarely isolated from one of the others.
The other commercial subjects are sure enough of their own academic
boundaries to leave traditional "Corporations" looking comparatively
18. G. CANFIELD & I. WORMSER, CASES ON PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1913).
19. W. CARY, CASES ANDMATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS (4th ed. 1969). A 1639-page Cary
and Eisenberg Fifth Edition successor in 1980 is no lighter. A 1400-page competitor, R. STEVENS &
H. HENN, STATUTES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINESS ENTERPRISES (1965), weighs close to six pounds.
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dispensable to many students free to by-pass a reputedly dry, bulky, and
esoteric elective.
Nonetheless, many old and new organizational issues and developments still do come together in a schema so coherent in underlying
theme, so intriguing when examined in relationship to each other, and so
close to great questions of law, organized social effort, and individual life,
that they cannot be displaced from unitary consideration, under
whatever name, in a basic law curriculum. A banner they would all go
under is regulation of the resources and control of organizational effort.
The main theme is the interaction, and hence the fair balance to be
struck, between the advantages and benefits to insiders, outsiders and
society in the financing and control of an organized effort, as against the
risks, costs, and constraints which society should impose on account of
such benefits.
Under such a banner, with all that should be brought under it, one
can formulate criteria for jettisoning, or communicating in new ways,
much that is high-clerical only; putting trade-creditor protection against
financial skulduggery in reduced, modern perspective; and getting together some strayed or straying areas needed for the vitality of the whole.
One such area includes securities regulation issues involving transfers of shares. Share transferability is a corporate advantage of equal
importance to shareholder non-liability. Legal issues involving transfer,
especially those touching financing, control, and the fiduciary implications of the combination, were never isolated from corporations when
"investor protection" law was thin and overshadowed by the "creditor
protection" function of stated capital. Place was always made for the
Old Dominion Copper cases, 20 in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court determined, in disagreement with Mr. Justice Holmes and a
majority of the United States Supreme Court, that some redress would be
provided in equity, through the device of a corporate recovery, against
promoters' dubious property transactions not disclosed to public investors in a later original issuance from the corporation.
When federal statutes, mainly the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities
Act) 2 1 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)22 were
enacted to afford more effective investor protection in connection with
securities transfers, the misimpression arose that a body of law independent from corporations had been created. This attitude persisted as legislative concern, administrative actions, and judicial decisions expanded
20. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206 (1907); Old Do-

minion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 89 N.E. 193 (1909).
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).
22. Id. §§ 78a-78hh.
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the impact of those statutes. By 1946, the Exchange Act, which dealt
mainly with post-distribution securities trading, although in language derived from the Securities Act control of initial public distributions, had
already been extended to the affairs of a two-family corporation in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co. 23 Latty foresaw in 195324 that this development in the Kardon case was a portent of a wider impact for both
statutes on a "private fight" over a Main Street store 2 s and "private"
26
deals in close corporations.
From then on, securities transfer control as a hook has held a
mounting weight of federal surveillance of corporate operations and
management, so that now the state legislative "enabling" approach
emerges as passive and ministerial by comparison, the state administrative "blue sky" approach as subordinate to the federal in most states, and
the procedural criteria for shareholder court action as often fruitless
alongside federal statute-based actions brought through civil, administrative, class, derivative, and criminal proceedings in federal courts.
The need for the advanced "securities regulations" courses and seminars which appeared in the 1960s to deal in detail and depth with aspects of these and related statutes is not questioned and is in fact
confirmed by these developments. But the developments represent too
significant a shift from state to federal pre-occupation with the legal affairs of all-sized enterprises, including small and non-corporate, to await
"advanced" consideration only. An offering of costs and risks of control
and financing without substantial and cohesive treatment of these issues
would be a crust without a large part of the center.
In the last year, three more strong threads have woven securities
control closer into a pattern of general organizational control. First,
through the administrative'actions of rules 144-147 (later supplemented
by Regulation D), 27 the Securities and Exchange Commission tightened
regulation of the sale and resale of securities not involving any public
offering ("restricted securities"), with an effect on the financial planning
of small and medium-sized corporations as great as many conventional
state rules on organization and capital maintenance. Second, through
23. 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). For a more recent case involving application of the disclosure requirements of the Exchange Act to a "closely controlled three-person" corporation previously
conducted as three partnerships, see Levin v. Marder, 343 F. Supp. 1050 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
24. Latty, The Aggrieved Buyer or Seller or Holder of Shares in a Close Corporation Under the
S.E.C. Statutes, 18 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 505, 506 (1953).
25. Id. at 505.
26. Id. at 509.
27. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223, 37 Fed. Reg. 596 (Jan. 11, 1972) (codified at 17
C.F.R. § 230.144 (1972)); SEC Securities Act Release No. 5336, Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,108
(Nov. 28, 1972) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (1972)).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1988:1

private action, a proposed Federal Securities Code, 28 which was submitted for discussion to the American Law Institute, represented a major
effort, albeit never enacted in toto, to integrate the present bifurcated approach, multiple registrations, and overlapping provisions affecting disclosure and transfers, into a consistent federal company registration and
continual disclosure plan. Am incidental result has been to make less
tenable the present division of the Securities Act problems largely in advanced courses and the Exchange Act problems in a basic course. Third,
the United States Supreme Court indicated, without dissent, in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 29 that "whatever
might be available as a remedy under state law," section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act should be given a broad construction, not limited to "preserving the integrity of the securities markets..., though that purpose is
included."' 30 The Court has confirmed this broad construction in Car31
penter v. United States.
As "Corporations" (or "organizations") embraces much new federal
corporation law, it cannot neglect a second area commonly eclipsed, if
not excluded: small business proprietorship and partnership. Agency is
well gone as a separate study of common law principles and equitable
considerations, as was partnership before it, and as "Corporations"
would be if confined to corporations. New flexibility of form in organizational planning is now available, however, under a relaxing judicial attitude toward deviation from a single norm, under close corporation
statutes enacted in the wake of Latty's pioneering drafting and "promotional" efforts in North Carolina,32 and under tax provisions for tailoring
features of different associational forms into a single association. 33 A
more unitary grasp of the principal tort, contracts, equity, and tax consequences of unincorporated and incorporated enterprises together thus becomes more imperative than ever. Furthermore, neat division of subject
28. FED. SEC. CODE (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972).

29. 404 U.S. 6 (1971); see Note, Bankers Life: Payingfor a Corporationby Selling Its Securities
Violates 10b-5, 1972 DUKE L.J. 465. Bankers Life was followed in Jannes v. Microwave Communications, Inc., 461 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1972) (reversing the district court's ruling that no federal claim
was stated in a derivative action for waste and diversion of assets).
30. 404 U.S. at 12.
31. 108 S.Ct. 316 (1987).
32. See Latty, The Close Corporationand the New North CarolinaBusiness CorporationAct, 34
N.C.L. REV. 432 (1956); Latty, Powers & Breckenridge, The ProposedNorth CarolinaBusiness Corporation Act, 33 N.C.L. REV. 26 (1954).
33. Internal Revenue Code of 1954 § 7701 defines organizations for tax purposes independently
of local law, so that a corporation for tax purposes may be an unincorporated association. Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, §§ 1371-1379 (Subchapter S), provides some noncorporate tax advantages to
certain corporations. The Treasury Department has acquiesced in the treatment of certain professional associations as valid corporations for federal income tax purposes. T.I.R. No.1019, Rev. Rul.
70-101, 1970-1 C.B. 278; Rev. Rul. 70-455, 1970-2 C.B. 297.
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matter and courses between small business ("Main Street") and public
corporations ("Wall Street"), while attractive superficially, cannot be
made without severance of many basic principles common to both and
many basic problems involving both.
A "corporate" student, or lawyer, who does not know anything
about the idea of "authority," or what an unincorporated principal or a
partner is, or does, and why, will not know how to assess the control and
financing problems of a joint corporate business venture, or a limited
partnership with corporate partners, or a franchising relationship or arrangement among corporations. Nor will he know quite what to make of
a corporate statutory provision that invites "parties to the agreement or
...stockholders of the corporation to treat the corporation as if it were a
partnership or to arrange [corporate] relations . . . in a manner that
would be appropriate only among partners."' 34 Nor will he sense the difficulty in a partnership statute that defines the partners' power to bind
the partnership as including acts which "apparently [carry] on in the
usual way the business of the partnership... unless... the person with
whom he is dealing... [knows] he has no such authority. ' 35 Nor will he
react critically to an alleged partnership case that tells him that "the true
test of a partnership, at last, is left to be that of the relation of the parties
as principal and agent."136 Nor will he approach with confidence securities fraud litigation under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, such as a
recent case against a brokerage firm whose president allegedly persuaded
the plaintiff customer to remove his funds from the firm's care and repose
them with the president in a personal "Ponzi" scheme. 37 Nor will he
appreciate the implications of the recent case of a personal, individual
guaranty of business purchases given to the plaintiff by three partners
engaged in partnership purchasing, but on which their liability was not
asserted until eleven months after they had incorporated that business
and had been purchasing from the plaintiff and paying as a corporation
rather than a partnership.38 In that case, the court suggested that the
individual defendants should have given "formal" notice to the plaintiff
of their switch from a partnership to a corporation. 39 The dissent believed that the plaintiff's loss should be chargeable to "poor communication" between the plaintiff's credit and sales departments, thereby
causing the failure of the credit department to know that the plaintiff was
34. 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 354 (Supp. 1968).

35. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9(1); see, eg., National Biscuit Co. v. Stroud, 249 N.C.
467, 106 S.E.2d 692 (1959).
36. Harvey v. Childs, 28 Ohio St. 319 (1876).
37. SEC v. First See. Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1972).
38. Kingsberry Homes v. Corey, 457 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1972).
39. Id. at 182.
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dealing with a corporation, 40 perhaps implying that the old partner-like
personal guaranty by the business "owners" of the now-incorporated
business was made legally ineffective by the change in form, or that it was
no longer an agreement of the parties.
Attempts to incorporate the unincorporated into published teaching
material in "corporations" courses are not new. Professor Frey started
in 1935 with Corporationsand Partnerships,which omitted a discussion
of agency. 4 1 Latty put agency, partnership, and "related topics in corporations" together in Introduction to Business Associations in 1949 (Basic
Business Associations, with Frampton, since 1963).42 Professor Conard's
earlier editions on business organization in 1950,43 emphasizing the relationship of agency and employment, effect a further integration, in 1972,
in Enterprise Organization: Cases, Statutes and Analysis on Licensing,
Employment, Agency, Partnerships,Associations, and Corporations.44 A
final bridge in mind but not yet built will have to unite the territory of
these materials with larger areas of the land lying in the leading
45
casebooks on corporations.
Meanwhile, parallel work to distill and clarify the law will proceed
apace, and will, if dreams come true, help trim it for the academic
squeeze. Professor Loss, a Reporter for the proposed ALI Federal Securities Code, undertook to reduce the federal statutory material to a
single, compact, smooth-flowing, understandable instrument that could
be hailed with swift passage by a grateful Congress. Congress balked, but
the proposed Code is still a nutshell of statutory securities law as it
should be, just as the proposed American Law Institute Tentative Drafts
of Principles of Corporate Governance are attempted clarifications of
what the state law of intra-corporate powers, duties, and liabilities are or
should be.
In the same spirit are hands being laid on the Uniform Partnership
and Limited Partnership Acts, comprehensible only in conjunction with
40. Id. at 184.
41. A. FREY, CASES AND STATUTES ON BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS (1935); see also A. FREY,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS (1951).
42. E. LATTY, INTRODUCTION TO BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS (1949);
E. LATrY & G. FRAMPTON, BASIC BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES, TEXT AND PROBLEMS (1963).
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comprehensible common-law and equity doctrines which the Acts aimed
ambivalently to eliminate or codify. A new Uniform Small Enterprises
Act could bring to partnership, at last, the simpler touch of the drafters
of close corporation acts. The attempt to subsume these organizational
forms under a single statute would isolate material for discard and illuminate material for academic regard. Such reform would benefit the law
and lawyers while demonstrating concurrently the feasibility of putting
these problems academically and practicably together.
As "corporations" makes room for non-corporations, let it also admit non-business corporations, a third area currently divorced from corporations, if curricularly recognized at all. In the last hundred years the
production of goods and services, the accumulation of wealth, and the
application of legal talent and ingenuity have been associated with business corporations. Organization for profit has furnished the conflicts, the
precedents, and the procedures.
The future, however, seems more bound than before to organizations that may generate motivations beyond profit for taxable distribution to "owners": nonprofit corporations, cooperatives, professional
corporations, community development corporations, foundations, institutes, and certain unincorporated associations. Basic organizational inquiry, therefore, should not be cut off from the features and problems of
nonprofit organizations. It is true that the purposes of these organization
drastically alter the context. But even without the interesting legal question of profit-nonprofit borderlines, organizational issues involving nonbusiness resources, costs, and controls may be usefully analogized to
business precedents, with mutual advantage to the understanding and
legal development of both types.
If the goal of embracing all that is essential seems possible, though
hard, there is still the unsolved, perhaps unsolvable, accommodation of a
fourth area vital to "Corporations": an understanding of accounting, the
symbolic language in which capital, costs, risks, profits, and prospects
are assessed and measured. Accounting illiteracy among law students
continues to be widespread, for law schools still eschew subject entrance
requirements and still purport not to teach basic communication in such
symbolic languages.
Organizations, those in control of organizations, accountants, and
even some investors are under legal strictures to communicate in accounting language about matters subject to legal controls, and a total
ignorance of the language can be totally incapacitating for analysis of
many legal issues. Professor Homer Kripke made plain, for example, the
sterility of approaching the key phrase of "material fact" in the law of
disclosure without reference to financial statements and accounting prin-
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Of "legal accounting" books, only one, Professor Katz' little volume 47 (230 pages) "for students and... lawyers... [having] no acquaintance with the subject,"'48 was directed primarily to basic remedial help.
It was designed in 1954 to be taken "before the courses in corporation
law and taxation," 49 which is rightly said but not readily done in a compressed curriculum where basic courses presuppose this basic skill.
Latty tried a different alternative, more than forty years ago, when
lie interrupted his corporations class for a few days or weeks to inject his
own simplified, but relatively complete, basic course in bookkeeping and
accounting. The solution was admirably direct, but in view of the cost in
course time, necessarily short-term.
No long-term solution completely inside or completely outside the
afflicted courses may be possible without new innovative arrangements
involving the institution itself and the courses suffering most from the
condition. The law school could subsidize special inducements or requirements, possibly impinging on first-year free time, that would combine the use of self-help guides, such as the basic accounting books for
lawyers published by continuing legal education institutes,50 short-course
orientations, demonstrations, videotapes, and computerized forms of
programmed learning that have proved successful in language and learning fields in reducing time and increasing efficiency in the acquisition of
basic skills.
Attempts to bring all these areas into the focus of one academic
subject, especially into one course, will be resisted as embracing too
much too superficially. The painful choices, though, seem inevitable.
The day is coming none too soon-and rightly, in my view-when the
second year of law will be the final one for those who choose to make it
so. The second year will call for work in depth and detail on matter
already related in a general complete overview. It will be differentiable
from the first year by teaching methods and institutional provisions
designed for such advanced work and understanding. (The third year, if
taken at all, would put the individual more completely on his own.)
A "subject" that cannot be made available in one course in such a
regimen, and cannot be grasped profitably in broad, cohesive outlines by
even a first-year student, will survive only as a specialty of limited inter46, See Kripke, Rule l0b-5 Liability and "Material""Facts," 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1061 (1971).
47. W. KATZ, INTRODUCTION TO ACCOUNTING (1954).

48. Id. at iii.
49, Id.
50. B. FERST & S. FERST, BASIC ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS (ALl) (2d ed. 1965); C.
OEHLER, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS (PLI) (2d ed. 1953).
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est. Legal problems in the context of basic organizational planning
should escape that fate. Against other contexts of issues contesting for
the finite hours of the main curriculum, these are by no measure too
settled, too esoteric, too peripheral, or too mundane. Not just to satisfy
the search for the identity of "organizations," nor just to preserve the
teaching spirit of Latty as he concentrated it on this section of law, these
issues and problems should survive as a curricular core together, as does
his teaching message, by reason of their natural alliance with the central
concerns of education, law, social policy, and life.

